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Abstract— The appearance of new forms of cyber-threats,
such as Multi-Stage Attacks (MSAs), creates new challenges
to which Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) need to adapt.
An MSA is launched in multiple sequential stages, which may
not be malicious when implemented individually, making the
detection of MSAs extremely challenging for most current
IDSs. In this paper, we present a novel IDS that exploits
contextual information in the form of Pattern-of-Life (PoL),
and information related to expert judgment on the network
behaviour. This IDS focuses on detecting an MSA, in real-time,
without previous training process. The main goal of the MSA
is to create a Point of Entry (PoE) to a target machine, which
could be used as part of an APT attack. Our results verify that
the use of contextual information improves the efficiency of
our IDS by enhancing the detection rate of MSAs in real-time
by 58%.
Keywords−Contextual Information, Dempster-Shafer The-
ory, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps, Intrusion Detection System, Multi-
Stage Attack, Network Security, Pattern-of-Life, Point of Entry
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-security has increasing importance to Internet users. The
appearance of new forms of cyber-threats, such as Multi-Stage
Attacks (MSAs), has created new challenges to which Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) need to adapt. To overcome these new
challenges, novel and more intelligent detection approaches need to
be proposed, and the detection process needs to exploit new sources
of information.
An MSA differs from traditional one-off network attacks as it
is launched in multiple stages and steps [1], and aims to maintain
long-term access to the target machine. Each of the stages that
composes an MSA comprises of different steps, which may not
be malicious when implemented individually, but all are necessary
for its successful completion. Only when executed sequentially,
the attacker could succeed in the completion of the MSAs. Also,
the time between separate attack stages can span hours, days or
months, making the detection of MSAs extremely challenging for
most current IDSs.
An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a complex version of
an MSA, and its main objective is data exfiltration and intelligence
appropriation. This attack targets selected organisations and persists
on the completion of the attack until it is achieved [2]. As part of
the APT life cycle, an attacker creates a Point of Entry (PoE) to the
target network. This is usually achieved by installing malware in
the targeted machine to leave a back-door open for future access.
A common technique employed to breach into the network, which
involves the use of social engineering, is by the use of a phishing
email containing both links to malicious websites, and malicious
attachments [3]. Nonetheless, as will be shown here, there are other
methods by which malware can be installed to create the PoE.
Current IDSs use measurable network traffic information from
the protected system or signatures of known cyber-attacks during
the intrusion detection process. However, these systems do not
generally take into account available high-level information (i.e.
above the network operation) regarding the protected system [4].
The next generation of IDSs should incorporate contextual infor-
mation, situational awareness and cognitive information, pertaining
to the judgment of experts on the network behaviour within the
intrusion detection process. IDSs should be able to adapt their
detection characteristics based not only on the measureable network
traffic information, but also on the context in which these systems
operate, and the information provided by the network users or
administrators.
In this paper, we present a novel unsupervised anomaly-based
IDS designed to detect MSAs, which exploits contextual informa-
tion in the form of a Pattern-of-Life (PoL) model, and information
related to expert judgment on the network behaviour. In particular,
this IDS focuses on detecting a 5-steps MSA, in real-time, without
previous training process. The main goal of this MSA is to create a
PoE to a targeted machine, which could be used for the completion
of an APT attack. As we previously demonstrated in [5], a Fuzzy
Cognitive Map (FCM) [7] can be used to incorporate the PoL into
the detection process, which would improve the detection results
of the IDS. The FCM is used to fine-tune the techniques used by
the IDS to assign evidence of attack. The experimental analysis
demonstrates the efficient detection performance of the proposed
IDS detecting an MSA when contextual information is considered.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, the
most relevant previous work is reviewed. The detection methodol-
ogy used by our IDS is explained in Section III. In Section IV,
the proposed approach for the use of an FCM within our IDS is
described. The network testbed and the analysed network traffic
dataset, as well as the implemented MSA are described in Sec-
tion V. Section VI describes the experiment results. Finally, con-
clusions and suggestions for future work are given in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
With the increasing complexity of cyber-attacks, the next gener-
ation of IDSs needs to detect network attacks by using measurable
data from the network, as well as available contextual information
into the detection process. The authors of [6] survey current research
on context-based information fusion systems, and highlight the
importance gained by these systems in the last few years.
A technique that provides the capability of integrating contextual
information to the detection process is the FCM. The authors of [7]
provide a detailed description of the FCM and its mathematical
foundation. The authors of [8] develop, using FCMs, an actionable
model of situation awareness for army infantry platoon leaders that
could replicate human cognition. Their FCM design structures the
goals and subgoals of the platoon, and the relationships between
these goals. The people responsible for designing this FCM model
do not provide weight values to the concepts, but rank the impor-
tance of each modelled concept. A similar approach is presented
in [9], in which situation awareness is represented using an FCM.
In [10], the authors use an FCM to model causal knowledge
within network data. Based on this knowledge, their system cal-
culates the severity of the modelled network data to attacks. This
approach allows the IDS to discard irrelevant events and focus only
on important ones. However, in contrast to the approach that we
propose, this research does not use an FCM to modify parameters
in the detection process, but as an events filtering process prior to
the actual detection.
Regarding predicting follow-up attack stages in MSAs, machine
learning has been used for training datasets to identify associations
between stages of attack and predicting the likelihood of a forth-
coming individual stage [11]. Many works on MSAs have also used
attack graphs on alert messages for network security assessment,
attack countermeasure selection and mitigation deployment [12].
The attack graph technique has also been used in collaboration with
alert correlation clustering to decrease the false positive alerts [13].
However, attack graph techniques do not scale effectively to repre-
sent rich and complex scenarios and for this reason are impractical
to use in real case environments.
The authors of [14] propose a flow-based IDS to detect brute
force Secure Shell (SSH) attacks in real-time. This work considers
a brute force SSH attack as a 3-phase MSA. The IDS uses the
metrics packets-per-flow and minimum number of flow records to
identify the different phases of the attack. The detection is based
on a number of thresholds defined based on these metrics. In [15],
a classification model based on machine learning techniques is
presented. This model is evaluated using a malware employed to
implement an APT. A number of features are extracted and used
to train machine learning techniques. Despite been an efficient
approach, this model is limited to the detection of the same malware
used during the training process.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION METHODOLOGY
The detection methodology that we present builds upon the
unsupervised anomaly-based IDS that we presented in [5]. It is
based on the combined use of various metrics from multiple layers
of the protocol stack to carry out the detection. Each metric provides
different levels of evidence about the real nature of the network
traffic. It uses the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory [16] as the data
fusion technique. The goal is to create an overall belief on whether
the currently analysed network traffic is normal or malicious.
A. Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
D-S is a data fusion technique that combines evidence of infor-
mation from multiple and heterogeneous events in order to calculate
the belief of occurrence of another event. Since we want to identify
whether the analysed network traffic is normal or malicious, the
frame of discernment Θ (i.e. the finite set of all possible mutually
exclusive outcomes) is comprised of two elements, N =Normal and
A = Attack. Hence, the hypotheses for this problem are defined as
the power set {N,A,{N|A}, /0}, 2Θ. The subset {N|A} corresponds
to Uncertainty (either N or A), and /0 is the empty set.
Each hypothesis is assigned a belief value within the range [0, 1],
also known as a Basic Probability Assignment (BPA), through
the mass probability function m. This belief value expresses the
evidence attributed directly to the hypothesis. This is:
m : 2Θ → [0,1] i f

m( /0) = 0
m(H)≥ 0, ∀ H ⊆Θ
∑
H⊆Θ
m(H) = 1
(1)
Then, Dempster’s rule of combination is used to calculate the
orthogonal summation of the belief values from two different
observers, and fuses this information into a single belief. This
rule is defined in (2), where m1(H) and m2(H) are the beliefs in
the hypothesis H, from observers 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly,
X
⋂
Y = H refers to all combinations of evidence which yield H;
whereas X
⋂
Y = /0 refers to the mutually exclusive subsets of the
hypothesis H, thus their intersection is the empty set.
m(H) =
∑X⋂Y=H m1(X) ·m2(Y )
1−∑X⋂Y= /0 m1(X) ·m2(Y ) ∀ H 6= /0 (2)
B. Automatic Basic Probability Assignment Methodology
Although D-S depends on the BPA, D-S theory does not dictate
a specific methodology to derive the belief values. There exist
multiple proposed methods to assign BPA values but few of them
could be used without a prior thorough training or fine tuning
period. In [17], we proposed a novel BPA methodology which is
able to automatically adapt the belief assignment to the current
characteristics of the network traffic, without intervention from
an IDS administrator. This methodology uses three independent
statistical approaches to provide the belief values for each of the
hypothesis:
• The assignment of BPA values in the hypothesis Normal uses
the distribution of the network traffic. The BPA in Normal,
m(N), indicates how strong the belief is that the current
analysed data are non-malicious.
• The assignment of BPA values in Attack uses the Euclidean
distance from a defined reference. The BPA in Attack, m(A),
indicates how strong the belief is that the current analysed
data are malicious.
• The BPA in the hypothesis Uncertainty is assigned based on
the values m(N) and m(A). The belief in Uncertainty, m(U),
indicates how doubtful the system is regarding whether the
current analysed data are malicious or normal.
Further description about the BPA methodology can be found
in [17]. The BPA values generated by all the observers are then
fused according to Dempster’s rule of combination (2). After the
data fusion process, the network traffic is classified according to
the hypothesis with the highest BPA, which is considered to be the
correct decision.
IV. MODELLING CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
This work employs one of the three methodologies that we
previously proposed in [5]. In particular, an FCM is integrated
within an IDS to include the contextual information into the
detection process. It is based on the adjustment of the BPA values
assigned prior to the data fusion process, by using the outcome of
the FCM. This is done by adding the outcome of the FCM to m(N)
and m(A). Then, m(U) is calculated using the newly computed
values of m(N) and m(A). The adjustment is applied to each of the
considered metrics. It is worth noting that, because it is unlikely
for the metrics to be assigned the same BPA value, the adjustments
would impact each of the metrics differently.
A. Fuzzy Cognitive Map
An FCM is a technique used for prediction and decision making,
which can be applied to represent the behaviour of a system as
perceived by human experts. The main goal of modelling a decision
problem using an FCM is to predict the outcome of the evaluated
problem by letting the relevant events interact, and to calculate the
degree of influence that one event may have upon the system.
The graphical design of an FCM is characterised by a set of
nodes interconnected by causal links. The nodes represent time-
varying concepts, events or actions that describe the behaviour of
the system. Each node C carries a weight A(t) in the fuzzy range
[0, 1], which indicates the importance that the concept has in the
system, at time t. The links between nodes represent the causal
relationship between concepts. Each link is assigned a weight value
wi j(t) in the fuzzy interval [-1, 1], which indicates the relationship
and degree of influence from the nodes Ci to C j. There are three
possible relationships between nodes: 1) wi j > 0, indicating a
positive relationship (i.e. A j(t) increases as Ai(t) also increases); 2)
wi j < 0, negative relationship (i.e. Aj(t) increases as Ai(t) decreases,
and A j(t) decreases as Ai(t) increases); 3) wi j = 0, no relationship.
A description of the design of FCM models can be found in [7].
An FCM can be represented by an [m×m] adjacency matrix
M, where [M(t)]i j = |wi j(t)|, and m is the number of nodes in the
modelled FCM. The matrix M describes the relationship between
the nodes and the weight values wi j(t) associated with each link.
The FCMs evolve via an iterative process in which, at each future
time step, the weight value of each concept A(t) is computed using
an activation function f . The value of Ai(t) changes at each iteration
as described in (3):
Ai(t+1) = f (K) = f
(
Ai(t)+
m
∑
j=1 j 6=i
wi j(t) ·A j(t)
)
(3)
where Ai(t+1) is the weight value of node Ci at time t+1, A j(t)
is the weight value of node C j at time t, and w ji(t) is the degree
of influence of node Ci on node C j.
In this work, we have employed the hyperbolic tangent activation
function, defined in (4). This function produces weight values Ai(t)
normalised in the range [-1, 1]. The FCM process continues for
a number of iterations until the activation function converges to a
final fixed model (i.e. when the weight values A(t) in all the nodes
do not change in successive iterations). In our experiments, the
activation function always converges after a number of iterations.
f (K) =
eK − e−K
eK + e−K
(4)
B. FCM Design Based on Contextual Information
In this work, we have made use of two main sources of contextual
information. First, the PoL of the network usage generated by mon-
itoring the behaviour of the network over a period of time. Second,
information related to expert judgment on network behaviour during
the different stages of the MSA implemented in our experiments.
In order to model the contextual information, four nodes have
been defined. These represent the different steps that compose
the implemented MSA: fping, nmap, OpenVAS, and Brute Force
SSH. Also, two additional concepts have been defined as the two
possible outcomes of the FCM (i.e. C5 =Normal and C6 = Attack).
The weights A(t) associated with these two concepts are used to
incorporate the contextual information into the detection process of
our IDS. The relationships between concepts have been designed by
the network administrator, and the weight values wi j(t) are assigned
based on previous knowledge.
The FCM model used in our experiments is represented in Fig. 1.
As can be seen, only four weights wi j have been included in the
FCM model representation. The actual weights wi j used in our
experiments have been tabulated in the [6×6] matrix M, as shown
in Fig. 2. As an example, the weight w15 = 0.7, which represents
the level of influence of node C1 on C5, corresponds with the (1,5)th
element of the adjacency matrix. In this example, since fping can
be benign, a high weight value is assigned to w15. Also, since fping
may also be part of an MSA, a very low weight value is assigned
to the concept Attack (i.e. w16 = 0.1). Similarly, a low weight value
is assigned to w12 because fping can be followed by nmap as part
of an MSA, although it may not be always the case.
It is assumed that the network usage would show unexpected
measurable changes from the normal behaviour of the network
during the implementation of the different steps of the MSA, which
could occur at any time of the day. These abnormal changes would
manifest themselves differently in each analysed metric. Based on
this assumption, we have defined a number of thresholds for the
detection system to infer which of the MSA steps is being measured.
In particular, these thresholds correspond with the metric value
expected at a given time and day, based on the PoL of the network.
C1
fping
C2
nmap
C3
OpenVAS
C4
Brute
Force
SSH
C5
Normal
C6
Attack
w12 = 0.3
w15 = 0.7
w23 = 0.3
w45 = 0.3
Fig. 1. FCM model of the MSA attack used in the presented experiments,
in which nodes represent steps of the MSA and connections denote the
relationships between concepts.
M =

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C1 0 0.3 0 0 0.7 0.1
C2 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
C3 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.7
C4 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.9
C5 0 0 0 0 0 −0.1
C6 0 0 0 0 −0.3 0

Fig. 2. [6×6] adjacency matrix including the weight values wi j used in
our experiments. It maps the FCM model shown in Fig. 1.
We have also provided an approach to address the challenge
created by the temporal relation between the different steps of the
MSA. We have defined a fixed time frame, within which the weight
value of Ai(t) remains active after the attack in Ci, i=[1, 4] has been
detected. Since the MSA design for this work runs lasted for 7
minutes, we have empirically set the time frame to 2 minutes. As an
example, consider the situation in which the IDS detects C2 = nmap,
the initial vector state would be A(0) = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]. If the
IDS detects C3 = OpenVAS within the following 2 minutes, the
initial vector state would be A(0) = [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]. However,
if the IDS detects C3 = OpenVAS once the predefined 2 minutes
time frame has expired, the initial vector state would then be
A(0) = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]. This approach would bring the temporal
relation between the different MSA steps into the initial vector state
employed in (3).
V. TESTBED AND NETWORK TRAFFIC MEASUREMENTS
A. Testbed LAN
The live operational IDS that we present has been evaluated in
an Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN) testbed presented in Fig. 3.
This testbed LAN includes an attacker PC running Kali Linux, and
a victim PC running our IDS. The attacker initiates an MSA against
the victim PC. Additionally, the testbed LAN comprises a portion of
the University’s network. This is represented by the office network
within the dashed box. The PCs in the office network are used by
15 researchers daily for Internet access. One Cisco switch was used
to aggregate the traffic from these PCs using a SPAN port. The real
network traffic generated by the PCs in the office network is used
as realistic background traffic needed to construct the PoL.
B. Evaluated Multi-Stage Attack
The attacker implements an MSA against the victim. All the tools
used to implement the MSA can be found as part of the Penetration
Fig. 3. Logical topology of the testbed LAN; PC on the right initiates
an MSA against the victim PC in the left. The PCs in the Office Network
generate background traffic used to construct the PoL.
Testing Linux distribution Kali Linux [19]. A bash script was used
to automate and to reduce the delay of implementing the different
MSA steps. The attack lasted for 7 minutes approximately, and the
different steps were launched at aleatory times.
The implementation of the MSA is composed of five steps:
1) Scanning for active machines in the network, using fping
2) Scanning for open network ports, using nmap
3) Scanning for vulnerabilities, using OpenVAS
4) Dictionary brute force SSH and
5) Drop malicious payload, both using Metasploit
Fig. 4 represents the different stages and steps that compose
the MSA. Although the steps that comprise the MSA have been
specifically designed for this work, the order at which the different
stages are implemented follows the Zero Entry Hacking (ZEH)
methodology described in [1].
Initially, we assume that a passive reconnaissance stage has been
conducted in which the attacker obtains the username and the
network IP address where the targeted machine is connected. Since
the reconnaissance is implemented passively and does not actively
interact with the targeted victim, this step has been excluded from
the MSA detection process.
The first step in the scanning stage uses fping to obtain a list
of IP addresses for all the live machines in the network. This step
provides the attacker with the information required to identify the
specific IP address of the target. The next step is implemented using
the network mapper nmap [20]. This is a popular open source
tool that provides a variety of probing techniques for network
exploitation and security auditing. This step would provide the
attacker with a list of open ports in the target machine. The last step
during the scanning stage aims to identify possible vulnerabilities.
The vulnerability scan is implemented using OpenVAS [21], a soft-
ware framework that offers vulnerability scanning and vulnerability
management capabilities.
During the exploitation stage, the attacker exploits the informa-
tion obtained during the scanning stage. In particular, the fourth step
attempts to guess the login credentials of the target victim using a
dictionary brute force. The attacker uses a list of frequently used
passwords to establish an SSH connection to the target. Finally, the
attacker uses the connection established with the target to install
a malware payload that will leave a back-door open in the victim
machine. In other words, it will create a PoE to the target. The
penetration testing framework Metasploit [22] has been used to
implement the last two steps.
C. Network Traffic Measurements
The victim PC, which runs the IDS, gathers the network traffic
in pcap format using the network packets analyser Tcpdump [23].
Next, the pcap file is processed using tshark [24] to filter the relevant
set of metrics employed during the MSA detection process. It is
worth noting that the network traffic from the office network, used
as background traffic, was collected beforehand and retransmitted
Fig. 4. Diagram comprising the different stages and steps that compose
the 5-steps MSA employed in this work.
using tcpreplay [25]. A detailed description of the office network
can be found in [5].
Five different metrics have been extracted from the dataset,
which are used to carry out the intrusion detection analysis. These
metrics are Communication Rate (COM), i.e. the number of frames
transmitted per second; Destination Port Distribution (DPD), i.e. the
number of unique destination ports that receive traffic per second;
Throughput (THR), i.e. the number of transmitted bytes per second;
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), i.e. the number of ARP frames
transmitted per second; and SSH Request (SHR), i.e. the number
of SSH requests transmitted per second.
Due to the amount of data and the speed at which network
traffic is generated, analysing the information in a per frame basis
would be highly computationally demanding. Hence, we decided
to aggregate all the information per second, reducing therefore the
computational complexity of the detection process. The aggregation
of network traffic is conducted per metric. Then, the aggregated
metrics are analysed by the proposed IDS, including the contribu-
tion of the contextual information.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section describes the detection results of the presented IDS
in an online and live mode, and compares the results generated with
and without the use of an FCM. The dataset has been analysed
combining the metrics described in Section V-C. The main purpose
of the results is to evidence that the use of contextual information
improves the detection capabilities of the IDS.
The efficiency of the IDS has been evaluated using the following
performance metrics, which provide evidence of how effective the
IDSs are at making correct detections:
• Detection Rate (DR) - Proportion of malicious correctly
classified as anomalous among all the malicious data:
DR = T P/(T P+FN)
• False Positive Rate (FPr) - Proportion of normal data misclas-
sified as malicious among all the normal data:
FPr = FP/(T N+FP)
• Overall Success Rate (OSR) - Proportion of frames correctly
classified among all the data:
OSR = (T P+T N)/(T P+FP+T N+FN)
where True Positive (TP) represents anomalies classified as mali-
cious; True Negative (TN) represents normal instances classified
as normal; False Positive (FP) represents normal instances mis-
classified as attack; and False Negative (FN) represents anomalies
misclassified as normal.
The comparison evaluation of the experimental results with and
without the use of an FCM are presented in Figs. 5-7. The Y-axis
of the figures represents the results in percentage, while the X-axis
of the graphs represents time in seconds. The graphs in blue and
red correspond to the results with and without the use of contextual
information, respectively. All the figures include extra annotations
to help identify the different steps of the MSA.
Fig. 5. Detection Rate results comparison between the methodologies: IDS
with and without FCM.
Regarding the DR, there is an evident improvement in the
detection results when contextual information is included in the
detection process. The graphs in Fig. 5 display a step change
improvement, which relates to the different stages of the MSA that
have been detected. When the contextual information is considered,
the IDS is able to generate 74% of DR. The change improvement
is consistent in both graphs. However, when the MSA reaches
the step BF SSH, the IDS without an FCM starts misclassifying
a large portion of malicious traffic (i.e. produces FN alarms). At
the end of the MSA, the DR reaches 16% produced by the IDS
without contextual information. Additionally, the detection results
when FCM is considered are better for most of the experiments due
to a more accurate detection of the initial step fping.
Fig. 6. False Positive Rate results comparison between two methodologies:
IDS with and without FCM.
The FPr results of our IDS with and without the use of an FCM
are compared in Fig. 6. We can see that the use of contextual
information produces a relatively low number of false positive
alarms, reaching 12% of FPr at the end of the MSA. This represents
a 9% worsening in the FPr results in comparison with the IDS alone,
which reaches 3% of FPr. Nonetheless, it is worth repeating that
these results are generated by an unsupervised IDS detecting MSA,
without any prior training process. Therefore, producing 12% of
FPr at the end of the MSA can be considered as good results,
considering the improvement provided in terms of DR.
Fig. 7. Overall Success Rate results comparison between two methodolo-
gies: FCM in conjunction with IDS, and the IDS without FCM.
Fig. 7 presents the OSR comparison results. We can see that
there is no evident difference between the two approaches. When
the contextual information is considered as part of the detection
process, 87% of OSR is reached at the end of the attack. On
the other hand, the IDS without FCM produces only 2% of
improvement. The presented results evidence that the use of the
FCM provides improvement to the effectiveness of the IDS, without
greatly affecting the correct classification of normal network traffic.
In addition to the previous results, Fig. 8 shows the actual
progression of the belief in Attack given by the IDS as the different
stages of the MSA are implemented. The Y-axis of the figure
represents the belief value, while the X-axis of the graphs represents
time in seconds. As we can see, the belief value increases when the
different MSA steps are implemented and decreases when the attack
has stopped. As we can see, Fig. 8 also includes extra annotations
to help identify the different steps of the MSA.
Fig. 8. Progression of the Belief in Attack; As the different stages of
the MSA are implemented, the level of belief in Attack computed by
the Intrusion Detection System would increase. The figure includes extra
annotations to help identify the different steps of the MSA.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The appearance of new forms of cyber-threats, such as MSAs,
creates new challenges to which IDSs need to adapt. To over-
come these new challenges, novel and more intelligent detection
approaches need to be proposed, and new sources of information
need to be exploited during the detection process. In this paper we
have presented a live operational IDS able to efficiently detect the
presence of an MSA in real-time, without prior training process.
This novel IDS exploits contextual information in the form of PoL
model, and information related to expert judgment on the network
behaviour by the use of an FCM in conjunction with our IDS.
From the presented results, we can see that the use of contextual
information clearly improves the efficiency of our IDS detecting
an MSA. In terms of DR, the proposed live operational detection
system, including an FCM, has provided an improvement of 58% of
DR when compared against the IDS without an FCM. Nonetheless,
the number of FP alarms slightly increases when the contextual
information is considered, reaching 12% of FPr. Despite this 9%
increase in false alarms, the gain in terms of DR well justifies the
use of an FCM, and does not affect the results in terms of OSR.
It is important to highlight that the design of an FCM is very
context-specific, and may not be easily generalised. In our exper-
iments, we have employed a 5-steps MSA specifically designed
for this work. The design of the FCM has been adapted to this
particular case. Therefore, in order for the model to be applied
to other situations and to detect other MSAs, a new FCM design
should be constructed. Additionally, the approach that we have
implemented to address the temporal relation between MSA steps
does not efficiently adapt to the implementation of other MSAs. The
used time frame has been defined for this particular work. Hence,
efficiently addressing this challenge remains an open issue.
As for our future work, we wish to research novel methods to
characterise the contextual information in the FCM, and to propose
methods to automatically adapt the detection to different MSAs.
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